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Transparency in fisheries conservation and management measures 
Ruth A. Davis *, Quentin Hanich 
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia  
A B S T R A C T   
The adoption of effective fisheries conservation and management measures (‘CMM’) represents a critical stage in the process of sustainably managing global fishing 
stocks. It represents the point at which scientific data is integrated with law and policy considerations to generate concrete rules designed to constrain the behaviour 
of fishers and other stakeholders in order to promote desired conservation goals within a fishery. This paper will examine the fisheries CMM process within the 
broader framework of international law and policy for marine resource governance. It will consider transparency aspects at key stages of the CMM process including 
the gathering and sharing of data upon which measures are based, the tabling and negotiation of new measures in RFMO meetings, through to the monitoring and 
enforcement of CMM to ensure their implementation. At each stage, the paper will seek to explore the potential for transparency initiatives to improve the effec-
tiveness of fisheries CMM in promoting desired conservation and management goals within a fishery.   
1. Introduction 
The adoption of effective fisheries conservation and management 
measures (CMMs) by regional fisheries management organisations 
(RFMOs) represents a critical stage in the process of sustainably man-
aging global fish stocks. It represents the point at which scientific data is 
integrated with law and policy considerations to generate concrete rules 
designed to constrain the behaviour of fishers and other stakeholders in 
order to promote desired management and conservation goals within a 
fishery [1]. Mora et al. state that “the conversion of scientific advice into 
policy, through a participatory and transparent process, is at the core of 
achieving fisheries sustainability, regardless of other attributes of the 
fisheries.” [2]. 
Transparency can play a role in key aspects of the CMM process, from 
the gathering and sharing of data upon which CMMs are based, the 
process of negotiating new CMMs, through to the monitoring and 
enforcement activities that ensure implementation of, and compliance 
with, CMM. Transparency in this context refers to the openness and 
accessibility of information and decision-making procedures, both 
within the RFMO and in relation to non-members, and the degree to 
which public participation is supported. The aim of this paper is to 
explore the potential value of transparency measures at each stage in the 
development of effective fisheries CMM by an RFMO; to consider the 
type, quality and availability of information that is necessary for 
decision-makers to adopt effective CMM; to consider the impact of 
transparency on the process by which CMM are proposed, discussed and 
adopted; and the potential impact of transparency initiatives at the 
monitoring and enforcement stage. After discussing the international 
policy framework surrounding transparency principles, this paper will 
examine various stages in the process of developing and implementing 
fisheries CMMs from a transparency perspective. It will then offer some 
conclusions on the role of transparency in the process of adopting 
effective fisheries CMMs by RFMOs. 
1.1. Background and context 
Access to transboundary natural resources such as fisheries resources 
entails international responsibility and an obligation to pursue inter-
nationally agreed sustainability targets [3]. Consideration of this 
broader context is helpful in highlighting the significance of trans-
parency principles for decisions about resource use at the international 
level. It clarifies the basis for pursuing greater transparency in fisheries 
governance, and the potential limits or pitfalls that should be guarded 
against to make sure that, in seeking greater transparency, we are not 
creating further problems. 
The overarching international policy framework for natural resource 
management is provided by the United Nations Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs), an ambitious plan to end poverty, protect the planet 
and advance peace and prosperity for all [4]. Three of the SDGs in 
particular are important for setting fisheries CMMs. SDG 14, “Life Below 
Water”, calls for the harvesting of marine resources to be effectively 
regulated and an increase in the economic benefits from sustainable use 
of marine resources to accrue to less developed countries and small is-
land developing States. SDG 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”, 
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amongst other things, requires the development of “effective, account-
able and transparent institutions at all levels”. SDG 17, “Partnership for 
the Goals”, targets enhanced policy coherence (17.14), the sharing of 
knowledge and other resources (17.16), and the increased availability of 
“high quality, timely and reliable data” (17.18) in support of sustainable 
development. 
Alongside these broad sustainable development goals exists the in-
ternational legal framework for fisheries management, set down largely 
in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) [5] 
and the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) [6] under 
which primary responsibility for establishing international fisheries 
CMMs rests with RFMOs. As recently as December 2019 the United 
Nations General Assembly has urged RFMOs “to improve transparency 
and to ensure that their decision-making processes are fair and trans-
parent and facilitate the adoption of conservation and management 
measures in a timely and effective manner” [7]. Certain aspects of RFMO 
decision-making procedures are targeted by the General Assembly’s 
comments, which specifically identified “provisions for effective voting 
and objection procedures”, reliance on “best scientific information 
available”, the incorporation of precautionary and ecosystem ap-
proaches, and provisions addressing participatory rights as requiring 
particular attention [8]. On a separate but related matter, the General 
Assembly also highlighted “the importance of ensuring transparency of 
reporting of fishing activities within regional fisheries management or-
ganisations and arrangements in order to facilitate efforts to combat 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing …” [9]. 
Transparency is referenced both directly and indirectly in the un-
derlying framework of international fisheries law. Under Article 61 of 
the LOSC, coastal States must ensure that the living resources of their 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are not over-exploited, through proper 
CMM based on the best scientific evidence available to them. While 
transparency is not explicitly identified as a requirement for a CMM to 
be “proper”, the importance of adequate information for decision- 
making is recognized in Article 61(5) which requires the regular 
sharing and exchange of relevant data including scientific information, 
catch and effort statistics. Transparency is a key characteristic of any 
such process. 
The LOSC also requires coastal States and high seas fishing States to 
cooperate in developing CMM that apply to straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory species [10]. Implementation of this obligation to 
cooperate is facilitated by the UNFSA under which the cooperative 
gathering and sharing of data is promoted and transparency principles 
thereby implicitly endorsed. 
For example, UNFSA requires that cooperating States “adopt mea-
sures to ensure long-term sustainability of … stocks and promote the 
objective of their optimum utilization”; based on the “best scientific 
evidence available”, and to “collect and share, in a timely manner, 
complete and accurate data concerning fishing activities … as well as 
information from national and international research programmes” 
[11]. Furthermore, States are to apply a precautionary approach in 
relation to the conservation, management and exploitation of stocks and 
in so doing are to improve their decision-making by obtaining and 
sharing the best available scientific information [12]. 
UNFSA goes further than this however and, under Article 12, im-
poses clear requirements with regard to transparency in RFMO decision- 
making. This obliges States to ensure transparency in the activities and 
deliberations of RFMOs and includes making provision for representa-
tives from other relevant organisations to effectively participate in 
RFMO processes, as observers or otherwise. International fisheries law 
therefore includes important transparency obligations that apply both to 
information sharing and disclosure, and to openness in decision-making, 
in relation to the development of fisheries CMM. 
1.2. Why is transparency important in CMM decision-making? 
In civil society there is a general acknowledgment that transparency 
is ‘good’: “The importance ascribed to transparency is reflected in its 
near universal appearance in codes of conduct and best practices that 
have emerged since the 1990s” [13]. There are several dimensions to the 
perceived value that transparency adds to the decision-making process. 
First there is a general understanding that transparency facilitates access 
to more information and an assumption that this will lead to better 
quality decisions (and better conservation outcomes) [14]. In this re-
gard, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment states that “Environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level … States 
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness by making information 
widely available.” [15]. 
Second, it is assumed that a more transparent process will improve 
equity by mitigating power imbalances and enabling a more equitable 
distribution of conservation benefits and burdens, not just for now but 
into the future as well [16]. Equity is a key component of sustainable 
development, Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration stating that “the right to 
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental 
and environmental needs of present and future generations”, and Prin-
ciple 6 giving priority to “the special situation and needs of developing 
countries.” [17] In the development of fisheries CMMs, UNFSA explicitly 
requires that “States shall take into account the special requirements of 
developing States, in particular … the need to ensure that such measures 
do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate 
burden of conservation action onto developing States” [18]. 
Third, more equitable CMM are likely to be more effectively imple-
mented. Greater transparency is likely to engender greater trust in CMM 
negotiations and outcomes and greater support for their implementa-
tion. As Costanza et al. note, “Full stakeholder awareness and partici-
pation contributes to credible, accepted rules that identify and assign the 
corresponding responsibilities appropriately.” [19] And fourth, trans-
parency can be important for maintaining the ongoing legitimacy of 
RFMO management and the approval of their activities by stakeholders 
and the broader community. 
This fourth dimension invokes the concept of a Social License to 
Operate (SLO) and is increasingly relevant in relation to RFMOs and to 
the management of industrial fishing operations more generally. Voyer 
and van Leeuwen [20] point out that third parties are increasingly able 
to direct critical attention to areas of concern, including the social and 
environmental impacts of industrial activities, using social media and 
the internet to access information and mobilise political action. 
While Voyer and van Leeuwen are primarily concerned with fishing 
operations in the national and sub-national context, notable examples 
exist of third parties exerting pressure on international management 
organisations and RFMOs in response to dissatisfaction with their per-
formance. One example of this can be seen in the Southern Ocean fish-
eries for Patagonian toothfish in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) was struggling to address high levels of illegal, unreported 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing that were threatening the long term 
sustainability of these fisheries. In response, a group of industry and 
environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) collaborated to 
establish the International Southern Oceans Longline Fisheries Infor-
mation Clearing House (ISOFISH) [21]. ISOFISH successfully exposed 
many of the actors involved in the IUU fisheries and drew attention to 
the threat posed by IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean, thereby creating 
significant pressure on CCAMLR parties to take further action [22]. 
During this period, further pressure was brought to bear by the in-
ternational environmental NGO, Greenpeace. In 1999 and 2000 
Greenpeace launched two expeditions to the Southern Ocean by its 
vessel MV Arctic Sunrise, resulting in the high profile pursuit of a sus-
pected IUU vessel that ended in Mauritius where the vessel was pre-
vented from landing [23]. Information collected from these expeditions 
was submitted to CCAMLR and other international organisations. 
Informed by these various exposes, the Australian Government and 
others advocated strongly in CCAMLR for the adoption of measures to 
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combat IUU fishing, including the introduction of a Catch Documenta-
tion Scheme to eliminate market access for IUU catches. In 1999, 
Australia warned CCAMLR members that failure to respond effectively 
to the threat of IUU fishing would damage CCAMLR’s reputation [24]. 
The Catch Documentation Scheme was subsequently adopted by 
CCAMLR and implemented in 2001 [25]. 
External pressure on CCAMLR to further strengthen its measures 
against IUU fishing was maintained through an additional NGO and 
industry campaign to list Toothfish under appendix II of the Convention 
on the International Trade in Endangered Species [26]. The Australian 
government supported the campaign and tabled a proposal to CCAMLR 
in 2002 [27]. While the proposal was ultimately unsuccessful, it further 
exposed CCAMLR decision-making to international scrutiny and main-
tained pressure for CCAMLR to act decisively. Similar narratives exist for 
other international fisheries, including the management of Atlantic 
Bluefin tuna by the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) [28]; these cases illustrate the importance of 
maintaining stakeholder approval for RFMO operations and the role of 
transparency in maintaining the legitimacy of fisheries management 
processes. 
1.3. Recognising the limitations of transparency 
Transparency cannot be viewed in isolation, however, and must be 
considered within the context of the whole CMM process. It is important 
that transparency obligations be implemented thoughtfully to ensure 
that the CMM process is actually enhanced [29]. Increased transparency, 
with implications for privacy and for control of information, could 
actually work to reduce the quality and fairness of CMM decisions. 
While greater transparency is generally assumed to empower the less 
powerful, transparency requirements can sometimes exacerbate power 
imbalances, thereby furthering rather than reducing inequality [30]. 
Careful consideration of the context of each negotiation, the parties and 
the purpose of particular deliberations, will be required in order to 
determine the impact of transparency on equity outcomes. 
For example in the context of Pacific Ocean tuna fisheries, the only 
way that small island developing States (SIDS) can effectively negotiate 
with large economies such as the US or China is by forming a coalition. 
Seto and Hanich discuss the impact of various negotiating tactics upon 
deliberations of the annual meetings of the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) [31]. Collective negotiating strategies 
have been used successfully in the past by Pacific SIDS, requiring some 
level of confidentiality in negotiations in order for coalition parties to 
develop their collective strategy. In these circumstances, reduced levels 
of transparency can improve equity outcomes for developing States by 
counteracting existing power imbalances. 
Confidentiality at the plenary level in the same forum can however 
have significant adverse equity impacts. For example, Seto and Hanich 
discuss one occasion where the US pushed for negotiations to proceed as 
a closed discussion involving only Heads of Delegations (HODs). In this 
scenario, capacity constraints place the SIDS at a considerable disad-
vantage [32]. If negotiations are closed to all but the HODs, then dele-
gations are unable to make use of the expert knowledge of advisers upon 
whom they commonly rely. Accountability is further challenged by the 
potential for a powerful State to indicate support for a particular posi-
tion across the floor of the plenary, but then argue a contrary position 
within the confines of a confidential HOD negotiation. This type of tactic 
can be particularly difficult for the developing State HOD, operating 
with limited resources, to effectively counter. These scenarios illustrate 
how confidentiality in preparing for RFMO discussions can enable 
developing States to form negotiating coalitions that help to reduce 
power disparities. However, confidentiality in the RFMO plenary can 
reduce accountability and reinforce power disparities by limiting the 
participation of relevant stakeholders and experts who can support 
developing State delegations to best represent their own interests. 
The assumption that strengthening transparency requirements 
around resource-use decision-making will automatically lead to 
improved environmental outcomes must also be carefully examined. 
The impact of greater transparency upon environmental decision- 
making will depend upon relevant users having “access to and literacy 
regarding this information”, and upon the decision-maker being 
“responsive and vulnerable to accusations of poor sustainability per-
formance” [33]. For example, decision-makers typically require timely, 
synthesised information that is readily digestible by non-specialists. 
Provision by researchers of more information, particularly information 
that is more extensive and detailed than necessary, will be unlikely to 
improve decision-making. Accessibility and information literacy are 
therefore important considerations, ensuring not only that 
decision-makers have the information they require, but also that it is 
available in a format that is useful to them [34]. 
There also exists the more general problem of either too much in-
formation, or of misinformation and disinformation. As noted by Mol, 
“[i]n a disinformation age, information is out of control through over-
loads, misinformation and disinformation … Especially if we fail to have 
powerful, legitimate, and widely accepted institutions that can be trus-
ted to distinguish true from false information and that can help us to 
prioritize valuable above less valuable information, transparency can 
become the victim of its own success and disempower itself.” [35] 
Although ‘disinformation’ might simply be an unintended consequence 
of increased transparency, it could also be part of a deliberate strategy to 
confuse and thereby disempower civil society and other actors [36]. 
Therefore care must be taken in implementing transparency re-
quirements to ensure that equity goals are met and that enhanced 
availability of information actually leads to better resource- 
management decisions. With these limitations in mind, the next sec-
tion of the paper examines key stages of the process of developing and 
implementing fisheries CMM to consider where transparency obliga-
tions best fit and the potential impact of transparency measures, both 
good and bad. 
2. Opportunities for greater transparency at key stages in the 
CMM process 
2.1. Transparency in relation to the gathering and sharing of data 
How much, and what, information is necessary for an RFMO to have 
in order to adopt effective CMMs? It is generally assumed that more 
information will lead to better decisions, but it is unrealistic to assume 
that we can make fisheries management decisions in an environment of 
full information. Instead, strategic choices need to be made about the 
type, quality and quantity of information upon which we are prepared to 
make a decision and be satisfied that the decision is the best one that we 
can make. 
In terms of the type of information necessary for the adoption of new 
fisheries CMMs, some guidance can be gleaned from the LOSC re-
quirements for coastal States in relation to their EEZ obligations. Article 
61(3) of the LOSC requires coastal States to design measures that will 
maintain or restore target stocks to MSY, but also take into account 
relevant environmental and economic factors relating to the ecosystem 
and the fishery. Further, in giving effect to their duty to cooperate in 
order to conserve straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, the 
UNFSA requires States to apply an ecosystems-based and precautionary 
approach, take measures to eliminate excess fishing capacity and take 
into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers [37]. 
From these requirements, we can identify five broad types of infor-
mation that are important for fisheries management: biological, abiotic, 
operational, economic and social science/development information. In 
relation to this information there are two levels to transparency: first, 
whether the information exists in the first place, and second, whether 
(and to whom) that information is accessible. 
Biological information is necessary for the ecosystem based approach 
to management that is implicit in the LOSC and clearly mandated in the 
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UNFSA. The complexity and unpredictability of interactions between 
environmental drivers and pressures means that it is critical to consider 
if sufficient information has been incorporated into the predictive model 
or stock assessment when making decisions based upon biological in-
formation [38]. Biological information tends to exist for commercially 
valuable species, however if it has been collected under privatized 
research for the fishing industry it may be protected as ‘commercia-
l-in-confidence’. A lot of information exists, but it is not always generally 
accessible. This characteristic could have negative implications for 
ecosystems and species that do not have commercial value. In this 
context it is possible that transparency initiatives could exacerbate any 
information imbalance and detract from an ecosystems approach. 
Abiotic factors are increasingly important for decisions concerning 
preemptive fisheries management strategies in light of climate change 
impacts such as ocean acidification and altered patterns of global cur-
rents. Abiotic information can be subdivided into seascape information, 
generally more important for management of benthic organisms and 
nearshore fishing, and water quality characteristics, which are more 
important for decision-making regarding high seas and migratory 
pelagic species. While abiotic information is generally available, it can 
be expensive to maintain so that data remains current. 
Fisheries management decisions must take into account broader 
operational, economic and social factors if they are to effectively 
manage a fishery. Understanding the operation of a fishery – where 
vessels fish, how they fish, what gear they use, when and where trans-
shipments and landings occur, supply chains and so on – is critical for 
maximizing the effectiveness of management decisions while at the 
same time minimizing the impacts on the profitability of fishing oper-
ations. For example, it is inefficient to impose a closure on an entire 
fishery if it is only one type of fishing gear that is problematic. 
Economic information is particularly important for harvest strategies 
where managers seek to determine target reference points that, for 
instance, generate the most profitable catch per unit effort (CPUE) 
within the fishery’s limit reference points (usually maximum sustainable 
yield or MSY). The target can be hard to determine because one fisher 
may be profitable at a designated level while another is making a loss. 
Transparency is crucial in this scenario because a manager needs to 
know, for example, if one fisher’s ‘profitable’ CPUE is actually only 
profitable because of subsidies. Economic information is typically 
available to industry and would be critical information for managers, 
however is it also important for members of the public more generally? 
Industry is understandably reluctant to share commercially sensitive 
information and indeed perhaps there is no substantial benefit to having 
certain types of information openly available and we should instead be 
thinking about different levels of transparency for different types of 
information. 
Finally, there is increasing recognition of the importance of ‘social 
science’ or ‘development’ type information for good decision-making in 
resource conservation and management. Bennett at al [39] identify a 
number of social sciences relevant to the making of effective fisheries 
CMMs, including cultural relationships with nature and resources, 
human interactions with nature, politics, and psychology and law 
(relating to support, trust and compliance), in their review of the human 
dimensions in conservation. Social science and development data is 
increasingly available, however the disconnect between conservation 
science and social science makes it difficult to harness available infor-
mation for effective decision-making. Social science is also generally 
stronger and more comprehensive in regions with greater economic 
means and this uneven distribution of information has social justice 
implications where the availability of comprehensive information is 
reflective of regions and resources which are already advantaged. 
While the availability of these different types of information varies, a 
further issue is the accessibility of available information to decision- 
makers and to others. In this regard, digitization is a critical feature 
and fundamental to the challenge of improving the accessibility of in-
formation. It is still the case that significant fisheries data is only 
collected in paper form, which in practice makes it unavailable to most 
decision-makers in a timely and practical way. Power imbalances occur 
when wealthier nations are able to access and refer to digitized data 
during RFMO meetings while debate continues on a particular CMM. 
Countries that are unable to access such data are likely to remain sus-
picious in relation to the CMM proposal and, without being able to make 
their own judgments regarding the costs and benefits of any proposal, 
are likely to vote ‘no’. Improvements to the process of gathering and 
sharing data upon which decisions regarding CMM are made therefore 
have the potential to significantly improve conservation and equity 
outcomes. This would include the collection of data in electronic format 
where possible and the investment in a digital platform that allows ac-
cess to data for analysis in real time. 
2.2. Transparency in relation to negotiation and decision making upon 
CMM 
Transparency aspects of CMM negotiations center around who can 
participate in the negotiations and the extent to which RFMO de-
liberations are made public. Mora et al.’s study of the Management 
Effectiveness of the World’s Marine Fisheries[40] suggests that trans-
parency at this stage of the RFMO management process is perhaps the 
most critical to the overall success of CMMs in securing sustainable 
fisheries and acts as a ‘bottleneck’ in relation to conservation perfor-
mance. They state: 
“Of all management attributes analyzed (ie scientific robustness, 
policymaking transparency, implementation capability, fishing capac-
ity, subsidies, and access to foreign fishing) plus taking into account 
country wealth, we found that variations in policymaking transparency 
led to the largest difference in fisheries sustainability.” [41]. 
This finding reflects the key role played by fisheries CMM negotia-
tions in translating robust science into concrete actions. The manner in 
which negotiations are conducted, and the extent of participation and 
discussion, have a significant impact on the extent to which scientific 
advice is adopted and acted upon, or instead overridden for political or 
other reasons. Mora’s study also found that transparent and legitimate 
participation in policymaking promotes compliance with CMM, even 
where enforcement capacity is weak: “If the policy making process is 
participatory and legitimate, it is likely that even poorly enforced sys-
tems will move towards sustainability because of voluntary compli-
ance.” [42]. 
Webster’s analysis of the performance of ICCAT in relation to man-
agement of Atlantic bluefin tuna [43] highlights the critical role played 
by the RFMO in translating scientific advice into effective CMMs. 
Webster details a history of failure by the RFMO to set and enforce catch 
limits at levels recommended by ICCAT scientists, and notes that the 
Commission was finally prompted into taking action in response to 
moves (albeit ultimately unsuccessful) to have international trade in the 
species regulated under CITES [44]. In this scenario, the importance of 
publicly available information on key factors including the status of the 
stock, the scientific committee’s recommendations, the ICCAT’s rec-
ommended measures and actual catch levels, is highlighted. The avail-
ability of such information gave strength to efforts by certain 
governments [45] and NGOs to utilize the CITES process to improve 
conservation outcomes for the species. 
In considering the role of transparency requirements in relation to 
CMM negotiations, it is important to recognize that CMMs can be 
negotiated in different circumstances and these will give rise to different 
transparency considerations. Broadly speaking, CMMs can be divided 
into pre-emptive measures and ‘other’ measures. Pre-emptive (or pre-
cautionary) measures include the development of harvest control stra-
tegies and reference points. This type of CMM is more conducive to a 
fully transparent decision-making process because ultimately their 
effectiveness depends only on the transparency of scientific inputs. The 
decision-making framework is agreed in advance in circumstances that 
are less likely to be politically charged. Other measures can be 
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negotiated in circumstances that are more fraught – situations of ur-
gency, for example, and perhaps involving multiple stakeholders and 
multiple impacts. In these circumstances, a lack of transparency can 
result in a lack of trust amongst negotiating parties and this can block 
the reaching of agreement. If delegations are unable to properly analyse 
what is going on at the meeting, the likelihood of reaching agreement is 
greatly reduced. 
There are a number of factors that influence the degree of trans-
parency in fisheries CMM negotiations [46]. These include:  
� Who is allowed in the negotiating room? As well as the RFMO 
member States, should representatives of other RFMOs, environ-
mental NGOs, industry associations, civil society, media, or indeed 
any interested party be permitted to be present?  
� Once in the room, what are those representatives allowed to do? Can 
they simply observe? Can they take notes or interact with delega-
tions? Can they ask questions or participate in debates directly? Can 
they communicate with the outside world, eg through live Facebook 
updates or a Twitter feed?  
� Will the proceedings be made public, either contemporaneously (eg 
through a livestream broadcast) or later (eg by recording sessions 
and allowing access to recordings, transcripts or reports). If access to 
proceedings is made public, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that it can be both good and bad in terms of equity and conservation 
outcomes. While open proceedings might discourage bullying and 
similar abuses of power, it might also discourage bargaining and 
stifle debate. 
2.3. Transparency in relation to monitoring and enforcement of 
compliance with CMM 
Effective fisheries CMMs require mechanisms for monitoring their 
implementation and ensuring their compliance. Transparency has an 
important role in relation to compliance and enforcement data, not only 
for reasons of assessing the effectiveness of CMMs but also for main-
taining the reputation and legitimacy of the RFMOs themselves. There 
are significant developments in relation to the use of technology in 
fisheries monitoring and enforcement and also in relation to the devel-
opment of civil society and industry schemes designed to implement full 
traceability of fisheries products in order to ensure compliance with 
CMM. 
The implementation of monitoring and compliance schemes within 
RFMOs has typically been a difficult and contentious process, with the 
need to balance transparency gains against the confidentiality re-
quirements that have enabled members to submit the necessary moni-
toring and compliance data. For example, the Compliance Monitoring 
Scheme within the WCPFC is not transparent; there are no observers and 
the information is protected behind a firewall. Some of the recent de-
bates about the operation of the WCPFC scheme highlight the need to be 
clear about the reasons for seeking greater transparency, as these have 
implications for what should be transparent and to whom. The Forum 
Fisheries Agency, for example, tabled a proposal to amend the compli-
ance monitoring scheme to remove vessel-level scrutiny and replace it 
with “a broader [member]-level view of their overall implementation of 
obligations.” [47] The aim of the proposal was to streamline the 
compliance monitoring scheme and to better reflect the purpose of that 
scheme, which is to monitor member State implementation of CMMs 
rather than individual vessel compliance [48]. 
3. Conclusions 
Negotiation of fisheries CMMs is a key process in ensuring effective 
and sustainable international fisheries because it is the point at which 
scientific advice is translated into concrete conservation and manage-
ment actions. Fisheries management decision-making is challenging 
because of the dynamic context - constantly changing real world 
conditions, developments in scientific understanding and fluid political 
context. Furthermore, fisheries management problems are “collective 
action problems” requiring the cooperation of many different actors to 
solve. The importance of having a shared understanding, between 
stakeholders of greatly varying size and expertise, must be recognized. 
In this context, transparency is important both in relation to access to 
information and participation in the decision-making process. However, 
transparency needs to be approached strategically – who are we being 
transparent for, and why? Pursuant to the UNFSA, coastal and high seas 
fishing States, through RFMOs, are obliged to undertake precautionary 
and science-based decision-making in relation to the fisheries they are 
managing. Transparency has an important role to play in ensuring 
accountability and participation. However there are circumstances 
where confidentiality may sometimes be required in order for the RFMO 
to make decisions that comply with their obligations, for example, to 
ensure equity. Whilst transparency in CMM decision-making should be 
the default position, further work could be undertaken to determine 
when confidentiality and other limits to transparency better serve the 
requirements of UNFSA and sustainable management. 
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